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DLD-018       
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-3647 
 ___________ 
 
 LEE J. ROWLAND, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN THOMAS DURAN; DEPUTY WARDEN JACQUELINE  
MOTTER; DEPUTY HARKEY; SUPERINTENDENT MARIROSA  
LAMAS; DEPUTY ROBERT MARSH, Jr.; JEFFERY HORTON, Deputy 
Superintendent; TED WILLIAMS, Medical Department, Head Administration; C. 
SPANGLER, Medical Administration; MR. RACKOVAN, PA. State Facility  
Grievance Coordinator; T. MILLER, P.R.C. Committee; MS. C. REEDER, Medical 
Record; MS. RUPERT, Medical Nurse; DR. GREENBERG; P.A. SCHRACK 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-02299) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 24, 2013 
 Before:  SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  November 1, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lee J. Rowland appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
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complaint.  We will affirm. 
 Rowland, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
numerous employees of the Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) and SCI-
Rockview alleging that he received inadequate medical care at those facilities.  In brief, 
Rowland alleges that he injured his left foot in December 2010 when a step collapsed at 
CCCF and that personnel at that facility told him to treat it by icing it and keeping it 
elevated.  Rowland further alleges that he later received an x-ray in February 2011 while 
at SCI-Rockview, which revealed that his foot was broken, followed by a March 2011 
videoconference with an outside orthopedic doctor, who told him that the break appeared 
to be healing and recommended that he not apply extreme force or pressure on his injured 
foot.  Rowland alleges that he should have received an x-ray earlier and that his treatment 
was otherwise inadequate, though he does not claim that defendants should have 
provided him with any other kind of treatment in particular.  The defendants filed 
motions to dismiss on various grounds, and the District Court granted their motions and 
dismissed Rowland’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) after concluding that it does not 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that amendment would be futile.  
Rowland appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 After reviewing Rowland’s complaint de novo, we will affirm for the reasons 
adequately and thoroughly explained by the District Court.  In particular, we agree that 
Rowland’s allegations, accepted as true, do not raise an inference that any defendant 
acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 105-06 (1976).  To the contrary, Rowland’s allegations make it clear that he received 
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medical care for his foot, and neither his mere disagreement with that treatment nor its 
mere alleged inadequacy raises an inference of deliberate indifference.  See, e.g., id. at 
107 (explaining that “the question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques 
or forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment” 
and that “[a] medical decision not to order an X-ray . . . does not represent cruel and 
unusual punishment” because, at most, it might constitute malpractice).  Thus, we agree 
with the District Court both that Rowland’s complaint failed to state a claim and that any 
amendment of his complaint would be futile. 
 Rowland’s cursory arguments in his notice of appeal lack merit.  Rowland argues 
that the defendants’ briefs in support of their motions to dismiss were late and that the 
District Court “disregarded” his response in opposition to their motions, but we perceive 
no irregularity in that regard.  Rowland also asserts that the District Court’s “assessment 
that a broken foot can be treated and healed by faulty verbal and written communication  
. . . defies logic, medical treatment, and legal principles.”  The District Court, however, 
made no such assessment.  Instead, the District Court examined Rowland’s allegations 
regarding the assessments made and treatment provided by the medical defendants and 
properly concluded that they do not raise an inference of deliberate indifference. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
